It’s a chilly autumn day at London’s Wembley Stadium, and a man in a San Francisco 49ers American football jersey is getting increasingly agitated. He’s flown over from California to watch his team play in the UK, but the atmosphere isn’t quite as electric as he’s used to back home. The British have a more reserved, perhaps more cynical outlook on sport (and life), and you get the sense that the crowd haven’t fully bought into the bells and whistles of the National Football League (NFL), despite the vocal encouragement from the small band of travelling fans.
Still, it didn’t stop the latest set of games in the British capital from selling out, and with three more to come in 2014, the NFL’s International Series is going from strength to strength. At the same time, the sport has grown more popular in the UK. Since the first International Series game in 2007, amateur participation in the sport has risen by 15%, and UK viewing figures for the season-ending Superbowl doubled to 4m in 2013. Major League Baseball is following the same example, with games taking place in Sydney, Australia.
Sports organisations have a long history of capitalising on their global fanbases by selling tickets and merchandise to foreign fans, maximising revenues for broadcast rights, or attracting sponsorship from foreign markets. The more people they can call fans, the greater the opportunities.
Individual clubs have led the way. At Manchester United games, you’re as likely to see a pitch-side advertisement in Mandarin or Arabic as you are to see an English one. The club claims to have 108m fans in China, from a total of 659m worldwide, and has signed lucrative deals with sponsors such as the Chinese soft drink giant Wahaha. Outside of China, Manchester United have deals with companies ranging from food manufacturers such as Mamee (official noodles partner for Asia, Oceania and Middle East) to telecoms partners in dozens of countries from Azerbaijan to Zambia. Others have sought to emulate the club’s success by trying to grow their own following abroad. Eleven of England’s 20 Premier League football clubs opted to play pre-season friendlies in Asia or the Americas.
In the last few years though, clubs desperate to grow their team’s global appeal have risked angering and alienating supporters by shattering club traditions in the name of chasing foreign fans.
Cardiff City’s Malaysian owner Vincent Tan changed the century-old club’s kit from blue to red, which is seen as more auspicious in his homeland. Hull City owner Assem Allam wants to change the team’s name to Hull Tigers, to give the club a “stronger brand identity” on the international stage. Hull City supporters formed a campaign group called ‘City till we Die’ to fight the move, and the dispute rumbles on, with Mr Allam threatening to remove his financial backing and responding that the group “can die as soon as they want”.
When the priorities of the club owners and of its supporters begin to diverge, the outcome is rarely good—fan boycotts are commonplace, and in the past disaffected fans have even gone as far as setting up a whole new team. This was the case with FC United of Manchester, founded in 2005 in response to the hostile takeover of Manchester United by Malcolm Glazer. There have been similar grumblings of discontent from NFL fans as the International Series grows in size, amid rumours of a team permanently relocating to London.
One of the most attractive aspects of sport as a business prospect is the strength of the connection with the fans. But teams looking to expand their global fan base to access global revenue opportunities should be careful that doing so doesn’t weaken the bond with local supporters. Fans such as the man from San Francisco will follow their teams to the ends of the earth—but only for so long.
This post is part of a series managed by the Economist Intelligence Unit for HSBC Commercial Banking. Visit HSBC Global Connections for more insight on international business.
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