Economic Development

Supply chain resilience: semiconductor autonomy

October 13, 2022

Global

Supply chain resilience: semiconductor autonomy

October 13, 2022

Global
Oliver Sawbridge

Manager, Policy and Insights

Oliver Sawbridge is a policy and insights manager at Economist Impact in its new globalisation practice, and is particularly responsible for research and analysis on international trade. As the global economy is being transformed by multiple forces including geopolitics, technological progress and climate change, the new globalisation practice works with clients to navigate these structural shifts.

His insights provide context and meaning in an accessible way. They are informed by numerous years of policy experience, most recently at the Department for International Trade, where he delivered aspects of Britain’s free-trade agreement programme. Before this he was a policy and legislative researcher at the House of Commons.

Mr Sawbridge holds a master’s degree in international relations from the University of Auckland. His areas of expertise include geopolitics, trade and supply chains.

Semiconductors are an essential component found in goods ranging from household machines such as refrigerators, to automobiles and defence equipment. Securing access to this technology is essential for individuals, businesses and governments. This article assesses how to secure the supply of semiconductors.

Due to the complexity of semiconductor supply chains, there are limitations to what nations can accomplish unilaterally. The Biden administration's and the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) support this view. Fragmentation, specialisation and interdependence of the chip market make it impossible for one country to dominate. Disentangling the complex semiconductor global value chains will create severe supply-chain disruptions. Any attempt to reshore or “friendshore” semiconductor production without the proper mechanisms in place will lead to more supply side shocks, higher prices and potentially lower long-term growth. Moreover, ensuring self-sufficiency will require high levels of state aid—if this were determined injurious to competing foreign businesses, which is likely,—it would lead to countervailing duties by other nations in retaliation, resulting in restricted semiconductor trade and increased costs. 

To remain competitive, businesses involved in the semiconductor manufacturing process would still need to export to finance growth and innovation. Domesticating supply chains and using strong technology controls would not be beneficial for the European Union’s (EU) or the US’s businesses—or any other country or economic group.The European Chips Act, Trade and Technology Council (TCC) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework all recognise this. They provide a first step towards securing supply chains in a way that won’t damage global supply or business growth. For example, as part of the TCC, the US and the EU agreed to develop early warning mechanisms and more effectively monitor supply-chain systems while bolstering collaboration around export controls for semiconductors. 

Work needs to continue to strengthen supply chains to restrict the ability of countries to monopolise the semiconductor market. The EIU forecasts that over the next decade, China will become the leading producer of semiconductors, but will still lag on the most advanced chips. Therefore, continued multilateral engagement must remain that effectively uses trade policy measures such as export controls and investment screening tools. This would enable countries to raise their semiconductor production capabilities, while relying on other nations for inputs that they retain a competitive advantage in—increasing the resilience of supply chains and advanced chip manufacturing. 

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