The first non-market indicator of how worried Asia is about the coming Trump administration was the steady stream of emergency government meetings being called throughout the region once it became clear on Wednesday afternoon, local time, that there were no feasible paths left for Hillary Clinton to win the electoral college. With almost every pundit and prognosticator having forecasted a victory for Ms Clinton, if not a landslide, the shock was significant—and magnified by who the winner was: one doubts that a surprise John McCain victory in 2008, or a Mitt Romney comeback in 2012, would have provoked such  panic.

Unfortunately, it’s an understandable reaction. In almost every speech Mr Trump has given since he began his campaign fifteen months ago Trump has blamed China and, curiously, Japan for stealing jobs away from the United States through unfair trade, including currency manipulation. He pledged to bring those jobs back by renegotiating trade agreements and raising tariffs; he even threatened to leave the World Trade Organisation. The worries are not just economic: On matters of security, Mr Trump criticised the US’ two main allies in Asia, Japan and South Korea, for not paying their share of the cost of US protection, going so far as to wonder how long the US should continue protecting South Korea from North Korea “without payment.” He also suggested in an interview that he would be fine with Japan and South Korea developing nuclear weapons, a scenario that would almost certainly result in a new arms race in the region. And any such changes in trade or security would affect the entire region, not just the countries directly involved, amplifying each government’s worry.

Before the election, the worst case  for many countries in the region was that Ms Clinton would allow the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) to fail but otherwise maintain the trade and foreign policy status quo. It’s hard now not to see that as the best case.

The first 100 days in Asia

Although Asian markets have stabilised following big drops on Wednesday, whether they will reflect further backlash after Mr Trump is inaugurated on January 20th will be determined in part by whether his campaign rhetoric was just that—rhetoric—or if he means to actually pursue the policies he’s suggested. Given his penchant for explaining away bluster as a mere negotiating tactic, it’s hard to tell. But because US presidents have a relatively free hand to operate without Congressional approval on matters of foreign economic policy, there are some quick and easy moves that would count as  “wins” in the eyes of his supporters.

Besides withdrawing the US from the TPP, which would effectively kill the agreement, what else might he do economically? It seems likely that Mr Trump will label China a “currency manipulator” very soon after taking office, allowing  him to begin procedures for raising tariffs on Chinese imports. Tariff rises on Japanese and potentially South Korean imports could follow in short order, bringing the region—and the world—to the brink of an all-out trade war. The impact on growth in Asia would be substantial and immediate, likely derailing Japan’s hopes for reviving its economy and adding to China’s long list of economic woes.

In terms of security, the region is expecting confusion to reign, at least in the initial months. Officials and diplomats complain that the Trump campaign broke with tradition by not communicating with key countries in the run-up to the election; at a post-election event, one Japanese policymaker admitted the Japanese government still didn’t know who to talk to in the Trump camp. While Mr Trump’s upcoming meeting this month with Japanese Prime Minister Abe will, it is hoped, establish some baseline for maintaining the US-Japan alliance, other countries may remain in the dark until well after inauguration day.

The timing could not be worse for Asia. Over the past year, China has been increasingly aggressive in pursuing territorial claims, putting it into potential conflict with a host of countries, including Japan. The Chinese could use a prolonged period of confusion, if not outright US diplomatic absence, to expand its footprint, further exacerbating already high tensions. Mr Trump has barely mentioned North Korea—and so it should also be expected to maintain its habit of acting out when it feels the US isn’t paying it enough attention. To date, the US has responded to every provocation, such as the the recent nuclear test, sometimes with attempts at diplomacy, sometimes with sanctions, and sometimes just in condemnation. We have yet to see how North Korea reacts when a missile or nuclear test is ignored, let alone met with force.

The new age of anxiety

It’s been decades since Asia’s relations with the US have been so fraught and uncertain. As a candidate, Mr Trump was fond of saying that his unpredictability was a business strategy used to throw the negotiators on the other side of the table off their game. That might work well on a real estate deal, when the consequences of failure are low, but the amount of risk it injects the global economy and international relations makes many in Asia, as well as other regions, anxious. There are some early signs that President-elect Trump could be more even-tempered and stable than Candidate Trump. Unless that is the case, the region needs to prepare for its collective anxiety to not only continue but grow.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited (EIU) or any other member of The Economist Group. The Economist Group (including the EIU) cannot accept any responsibility or liability for reliance by any person on this article or any of the information, opinions or conclusions set out in the article.